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Abstract 
Philosophy and poetry for Shelley are considered as inter-related or even interchangeable. 
Nevertheless, critics have often struggled to reconcile the two sides of the figure of Shelley 
himself; the Romantic poet and the Enlightenment-inspired sceptical philosopher.  If, in a 
Lockean sense, language is both an imperfect conveyor of knowledge and, like for Thomas 
Paine, the tool of tyranny, then this raises the question of how Shelley is to operate as a 
poet. 
Focusing on ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’ this article considers not only how 
Shelley’s philosophy is thematically an aspect of the poem but also how this manifests itself 
aesthetically. The philosophical problem of the relationship between language and 
knowledge, this article contends, is an aesthetic one. Aesthetics and epistemology therefore 
intersect in the poem, overcoming the perceived tension between Shelley as poet and 
Shelley as philosopher.   
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In a commonly related anecdote of 1816, Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote in the registers of at 
least three hotels in the Vale of Chamonix that his occupation was ‘Democrat, Philanthropist 
and Atheist’ and his destination ‘Hell’.i Colin Jager suggests that of the words entered in the 
registers it was ‘atheist’ that caused most opprobrium.ii  This is evident from an 1819 review 
of Rosalind and Helen, different versions of which appeared in The Commercial Chronicle, 
The London Chronicle and The Gentleman’s Magazine, which had apparently received its 
information from Robert Southey. The review ends as follows: 
Mr Shelley is understood to be the person who, after gazing on Mont Blanc, 
registered himself in the Album as Percy Bysshe Shelley, Atheist; which gross 
and cheap bravado he, with the natural tact of the new school, took for a 
display of philosophic courage; and his obscure muse has been since 
constantly spreading all her foulness of those doctrines which a decent infidel 
would treat with respect, and in which the wise and honourable have in all 
ages found the perfection of wisdom and virtue.iii 
 
Not only is the word ‘Atheist’ the only word of Shelley’s entry that is mentioned at all, the 
author likening it to ‘foulness’, equally striking is the author’s dismissal of both Shelley’s 
philosophy and of his aesthetics. The reference to Shelley having written the term despite 
‘gazing on Mont Blanc’ is particularly significant. Richard Holmes points out that Shelley’s 
register entry challenged ‘the reputation Chamonix had among the travelling English at this 
time, as a natural temple of the Lord and a proof of the Deity by design.’iv Indeed, Timothy 
Webb cites an 1816 guestbook entry of the very sort that Shelley seems to be reacting to: 
‘Such scenes as these, then, inspire most forcibly the love of God’ (140). Shelley’s atheism is 
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therefore seen as both philosophically mistaken and a failure of aesthetic taste; he has 
failed in not appreciating the sublime Vale of Chamonix to be the work of the Creator. 
Instead, he has succumbed to his atheistic ‘obscure muse’. 
 Focusing on ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’, this article explores the connection 
between Shelley’s aesthetics and his philosophical scepticism. In particular, Shelley’s 
scepticism is demonstrated to not simply be a thematic concern of the poem, rather it is 
manifested aesthetically, informing Shelley’s very poetics and vice versa. Whereas ‘Hymn to 
Intellectual Beauty’s’ sister poem ‘Mont Blanc’ appears a more explicit engagement with the 
Vale-of-Chamonix-inspired sublime religiosity Shelley encountered in 1816, as well as poems 
such as Coleridge’s ‘Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni’ (1802), it is ‘Hymn to 
Intellectual Beauty’ where we observe Shelley’s articulation of a sublime yet sceptical 
poetics more generally.v  
The experiences of 1816 should not however be considered in isolation. Shelley’s 
interest in and focus on the power of language, and nomenclature most specifically, is a 
significant aspect of his critique of organised religion. The alteration of the term ‘God’ to 
‘Power’ between Laon and Cythna and The Revolt of Islam for example is not simply just an 
example of self-enforced censorship but, as I have argued elsewhere,vi can also be seen as 
thematically significant. Whereas in The Revolt of Islam ‘Power’, having replaced ‘God’, has 
a negative connotation in that it stands for all examples of hierarchical tyranny, the word 
also becomes strangely positive in a number of Shelley’s other works, particularly ‘Hymn to 
Intellectual Beauty’. As well as indicating a potential Spinozan influence on Shelley’s writing, 
it is well established that Spinoza was an influence on The Necessity of Atheism (1811) for 
instance, Shelley’s use of ‘Power’ turns out to be an appropriate and crucially indefinable 
abstract term for sublime experience; it avoids slipping into the discourse of religion and 
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faith.vii As Shelley puts it in ‘On Christianity’ regarding what he perceives to be the error of 
the Christian conception of the divine, ‘where indefiniteness ends, idolatry and 
anthropomorphism begin’.viii Christianity has attempted to define and make concrete that 
which is not, resulting in the error of the Christian deity. This error is described more 
forcefully in Shelley’s notes to Queen Mab: 
It is probable that the word God was originally only an expression denoting 
the unknown cause of the known events which men perceived in the 
universe. By the vulgar mistake of a metaphor for a real being, of a word for a 
thing, it became a man, endowed with human qualities and governing the 
universe as an earthly monarch governs his kingdom (Queen Mab, note to VI. 
l. 198, ll.137- 142).ix 
 
For Shelley, the error made by Christians in their conception of God is a linguistic, or more 
precisely, a semantic one; of mistaking a ‘word’ for a ‘thing’.  God is perceived to be no 
more than a metaphor or a ‘word’; a simple expression of causality. Christians have, for 
Shelley, deified an abstract concept which in linguistic or Marxist understanding would be 
seen as reification, or making an abstract noun concrete. In a letter written to Godwin in 
July 1812 – during the composition of Queen Mab x – Shelley establishes his belief that this 
misapplication of words to ideas is not simply a mere philosophical error but a mistake that 
can have profound and dangerous consequences: 
[…]words are the very things that so eminently contribute to the growth & 
establishment of prejudice: the learning of words before the mind is capable 
of attaching correspondent ideas to them, is like possessing machinery with 
the use of which we are so unacquainted as to be in danger of misusing it. 
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But [although] words are merely signs of ideas, how many evils, & how great 
spring from the annexing inadequate & improper ideas to words.xi  
 
Whereas Locke determines words to be mere signs of our ideas, Shelley goes further than 
this to suggest that although words are indeed simple signifiers, they also possess their own 
dangerous power. The misapplication of the word ‘God’ for instance has for Shelley led to 
the establishment of a dangerous and corrupt faith.  Furthermore, the references in Queen 
Mab and elsewhere to an ‘earthly monarch’ demonstrate how the conception of the 
infallible and monarchical Christian deity, based on a mere word, encourages tyrannical and 
authoritarian systems of a more terrestrial nature.  
Despite this, the Queen Mab passage suggests a possible means by which Shelley can 
be a philosophically determined sceptic in his poetry. If the philosophical problem of God 
and the epistemological problem of causality are issues of linguistic expression, then Shelley 
can work these through in the act of poetic composition. In demonstrating an awareness of 
language and expression that present philosophical pitfalls for a sceptical poet, Shelley can 
work to avoid them. Whereas Queen Mab and Laon and Cythna show Shelley as having 
pinpointed the political dangers in the Christian anthropomorphism of the word ‘God’, 
‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’ demonstrates Shelley’s commitment to revitalising such 
language and thus working out how to avoid such anthropomorphism in poetical 
representation of the sublime. 
 Critical studies of Shelley’s approach to language, especially when concerned with 
language’s relation to power, often take an outwardly formalist approach and yet are 
simultaneously keen to stress the philosophical and historical background from which 
Shelley’s attitudes to language emerge. In particular, such studies stress the influence of the 
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empirical philosophy of Locke and Hume or Shelley’s reading of eighteenth-century linguistic 
theory.xii A key critical concern, however, is the difficult relation of Shelley’s reading of and 
admiration for such works, and the philosophical scepticism they offer, to his aesthetic or 
creative work as a poet.  If language, especially poetical or metaphorical language, is to be 
mistrusted, then this raises the question of how a poet such as Shelley is to operate.  
A helpful summary of this problem is offered by Angela Leighton. For Leighton, 
Shelley’s reading of enlightenment philosophy is explicitly connected with religion: ‘Shelley 
finds in the writings of Locke and Hume a description of the mind’s relation to the outside 
world to accord with his own radical atheism’ (1). Shelley, Leighton argues, utilises Locke’s 
anti-Cartesian ‘empirical theory of representative perception to put in question the 
existence of a benign God’ (1).  Leighton goes on to say, however, that ‘if empirical 
philosophy provides the youthful poet with a method of countering religious orthodoxy and 
of undermining the institutionalised dogmas of Christianity, it fails to provide him with a 
sympathetic account of poetic creativity’ (1). As a result, ‘it is in a sublime aesthetic, which 
develops alongside empirical philosophy but is in many ways antagonistic to it, that Shelley 
finds a language to protect inspiration as the original and mysterious power of poetry’ (1).  
In her consideration of Shelley’s political and philosophical concerns therefore, which she 
argues to be inseparable from his poetics or aesthetics, Leighton uncovers a core issue at 
the forefront of Shelley criticism. That is, the problem of reconciling Shelley as a poet of the 
sublime to Shelley the inheritor – and avid reader of – empiricist philosophy. 
 For Monika Lee, largely in concurrence with Leighton, this problem is considered 
more explicitly as a tension between two different conceptions, or ‘philosophies,’ of 
language that are both influential on Shelley in different ways:  
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Shelley inherited a philosophy of Enlightenment that included a belief in 
language as rational and empirical, in accord with standard eighteenth – and 
nineteenth – century interpretations of Locke. In that tradition language was 
thought to be referentially directed toward an empirical world of sensation. 
Shelley was also a successor to English Romantic poets (Wordsworth, 
Coleridge, Southey) who considered language as organic in nature and 
viewed it as inspired by the emotions and the imagination. In many of 
Shelley’s writings these two views appear to clash, and the seeming conflicts 
have provided ground for two widely divergent types of critics to claim 
Shelley, in the one case, as an advocate of materialism (i.e. Marxism, history, 
science) and, in the other, as a proponent of spirituality (i.e., Neo-Platonism, 
Manicheanism, Orphism).xiii 
 
Lee’s argument that in Shelley’s writing these different conceptions of language at times 
‘appear to clash’ suggests a certain lack of nuance and care in Shelley’s work, as if he is 
somehow naively unaware of the contradictions. Instead, Shelley was very conscious of this 
perceived tension. As a sceptic of language and ‘system’ more generally, Shelley finds 
neither approach to language on their own to be wholly adequate to his poetic and 
philosophical task and thus makes use of both. Although Lee’s suggestion that these 
conceptions of language sometimes ‘appear to clash’ may be overstating the case, there are 
nevertheless problems of, and with, language that Shelley purposefully leaves unresolved; 
‘indefiniteness’ is to be celebrated.  
It is in ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’ where Shelley most explicitly engages with 
attempting to articulate an unseen power or divinity without making, what he perceives to 
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be, the philosophical and linguistic errors of organised religion. Central to Shelley ‘working 
through’ the problem of being both sceptic and poet, is in his scepticism of metaphor. The 
problem with metaphor for Shelley is that there is an inevitable eventual confusion of the 
signifier with the signified which not only has repercussions in a philosophical sense but also 
in a socio-political context. ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’, as a hymn, has been generally 
read as a quasi-religious poem.xiv Critics frequently read the poem as an indication, as 
Spencer Hall puts it, of Shelley’s ‘inherent religious sensibilities’ or as an exercise in neo-
Platonism.xv To suggest that the poet in ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’ possesses a religious 
sensibility however is appropriate only in the sense that he can be perceived as seeking 
answers to questions similarly contemplated by religion. Where he differs is in his refusal to 
settle for the same philosophically flawed answers.  
As with ‘Mont Blanc’, Shelley’s poem can be seen as similarly reacting to both the 
religiously-inflected sublime discourse encountered in 1816 as well as Wordsworth’s 
Immortality Ode and Coleridge’s ‘Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni’. In this 
poem, Shelley purposefully situates and articulates a sublime aesthetic as distinct from God 
and an anthropomorphic divine. The poet attempts to come to terms with ‘Intellectual 
Beauty’, which Donald Reiman and Neil Fraistat define, as meaning ‘nonmaterial’ beautyxvi 
empirically, and with a language that does not deify or reify this abstract intellectual beauty 
into something resembling the God of Christian conception. The poem opens as follows: 
THE awful shadow of some unseen Power  
  Floats though unseen among us,—visiting  
  This various world with as inconstant wing  
As summer winds that creep from flower to flower.—  
Like moonbeams that behind some piny mountain shower,          
     It visits with inconstant glance  
     Each human heart and countenance;  
Like hues and harmonies of evening,—  
     Like clouds in starlight widely spread,—  
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     Like memory of music fled,—         
     Like aught that for its grace may be  
Dear, and yet dearer for its mystery (ll. 1- 12). 
 
Immediately this ‘Power’ is established as ‘unseen’. This reference to sight sets this line in 
negotiation with Lockean epistemology that particularly emphasises the empirical power of 
sight. This ‘Power’ is therefore empirically unverifiable. Despite this difficulty in empirical 
verification, Shelley is nevertheless keen to avoid the potential, flawed, shortcut to 
knowledge and understanding that is offered by metaphor. Instead, we are presented with a 
series of similes or ‘approximations’. This ‘awful Power’, or at least its ‘shadow’, is pointedly 
not, for instance, ‘clouds in starlight’ or ‘memory of music fled’; it is simply like them. In this 
opening stanza the indefinability of this ‘unseen Power’ is the very point. It is like 
something, for instance, that is ‘Dear, and yet dearer for its mystery’. Michael O’Neill’s 
comment on the ‘fascinating openness to interpretation’ of Shelley’s lyric and shorter 
poems in which close reading will discover no ‘fixities or definites’ is helpful in this regard.xvii 
Not only does O’Neill highlight the complexity and accomplishment of Shelley’s lyric art, he 
also draws attention to Shelley’s philosophical resolution; of not ‘fixing’ to a determined 
meaning that which should not, and cannot, be fixed. In ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’ we 
are offered a sincere if implicit acknowledgement of the inadequacy of language with the 
poet comfortable in his inability to solve, or ‘fix’, philosophical problems.  
This idea is further developed in the second and third stanzas of the poem. In the 
first of these, the poet asks this ‘Spirit of Beauty’ a number of questions: 
Spirit of BEAUTY, that dost consecrate  
  With thine own hues all thou dost shine upon  
  Of human thought or form,—where art thou gone? 
Why dost thou pass away and leave our state,  
This dim vast vale of tears, vacant and desolate?  
     Ask why the sunlight not forever  
     Weaves rainbows o’er yon mountain-river,  
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Why aught should fail and fade that once is shown, 
     Why fear and dream and death and birth  
     Cast on the daylight of this earth  
     Such gloom,—why man has such a scope  
For love and hate, despondency and hope? (ll. 13-24). 
 
These ontological questions of being, concerning the transience of life, of beauty and of the 
contraries of man are left unanswered in the following stanza. Instead, the poet chastises 
those who affix names to these abstract notions, as if these mere words adequately solve 
such philosophical problems or answer such questions:  
No voice from some sublimer world hath ever 
  To sage or poet these responses given—  
  Therefore the names of God, and ghosts, and Heaven,  
Remain the records of their vain endeavour, 
Frail spells—whose uttered charm might not avail to sever, 
     From all we hear and all we see,         
     Doubt, chance, and mutability (ll. 25- 31). 
 
Forest Pyle sees this passage as serving ‘to nullify the entire history of proposed answers, to 
demystify the claims of all those “sages[s]” or “poet[s]” who may fancy that they have heard 
a response.’xviii These alleged responses are considered the result of philosophical ignorance 
and fraud. Having not received answers from ‘some sublimer world’, these sages and poets 
attribute the unknown to religious and supernatural causes. Yet, further to Pyle’s reading, 
these solutions are revealed to be mere names, the names of ‘God, and ghosts, and 
Heaven’. The fact that these are a Trinity of names, two of which closely resemble the 
Father and the Holy Spirit of Trinitarian Christianity, adds an additionally blasphemous tone 
to this passage. This line also echoes the ‘three words’ of ‘God, Hell and Heaven’ that are 
established as the basis of political power on earth in Canto IV of Laon and Cythna. These 
‘answers’ are not just philosophically flawed, but linguistically flawed also. These words 
serve not to enlighten man with knowledge of the universe; rather, they get in this 
enlightenment’s way. Here Shelley again adopts a Lockean tone, making a particular 
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reference to sensory empiricism, to sound and sight,  when he establishes that these names, 
these ‘frail spells’, aim ‘to sever, / From all we hear and all we see,/ Doubt, chance, and 
mutability’. The superstitious names of God, ghost and heaven are terms that discourage 
free inquiry, or ‘doubt’, into the causes of that which is experienced empirically in the world. 
Similarly, ‘chance’ and the ‘mutability’ of the Universe are too neatly explained away by the 
term God. The poet is optimistic, however, saying that these words ‘might not avail’ in 
preventing mankind’s enlightenment.  
In the alternate version of the poem, discovered in Scrope Davis’s notebook in 1976 
(referred to hereafter, following O’Neill’s lead, as SD: Hymn), ‘God and ghosts and Heaven’ 
(l. 27) is given as ‘Demon, Ghost and Heaven’. O’Neill has written thoughtfully on the 
variations between SD: Hymn and the version first published in The Examiner (Ex: Hymn), 
the version considered here, although he does not comment on this particular variation 
(‘Shelley’s Lyric Art’). Whereas the line in Ex: Hymn gives us ‘God’ with an upper case ‘g’, 
clearly indicating the one god of Judaeo-Christian conception, the SD: Hymn rendering of 
this as ‘Demon’ seems less provocative or ‘blasphemous’ in the sense that it does not target 
Christianity specifically but superstition more generally. On the other hand, the existence of 
SD: Hymn and knowledge of the textual variant it offers suggests an alternate reading of this 
line in which the established religion of Christianity becomes conflated with primitive and 
fearful superstition. In the rendering of Ex: Hymn alone, ‘God’ is grouped with supernatural 
‘ghosts’ but the fact  that ‘God’ seems almost interchangeable with ‘Demon’ in Shelley’s 
mind emphasises the Christian deity as a mere superstition.xix The fact that these names of 
‘God and ghosts and Heaven’ are ‘frail spells’ further emphasises the superstitious nature of 
such terms, as if they have been willed into existence by a wizard or witch.  
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If superstition and religion do not provide the answers to the ontological questions 
posed in the second stanza, this raises the question as to where such knowledge is to be 
obtained. Addressing the ‘spirit of beauty’, the poet establishes that the path towards 
enlightenment is found with this very spirit. ‘Enlightenment’ is appropriate in a literal sense, 
since it is through this spirit’s ‘light’ that one can attempt to obtain this elusive ‘truth’:  
 Thy light alone—like mist o’er mountains driven,  
     Or music by the night-wind sent  
     Through strings of some still instrument,  
     Or moonlight on a midnight stream,         
Gives grace and truth to life’s unquiet dream (ll. 32-6). 
The final line’s reference to ‘truth’, however, is not a claim for a definitive or ultimate 
certainty. Rather, ‘grace and truth’ are posited as quantifiable qualities or properties of 
‘life’s unquiet dream’ that are ‘Give[n]’ by this spirit of beauty rather than revealed or 
defined by it. The poet makes no great revelation or truth claims here even if this line is a 
reference, as O’Neill points out, to John 1:17 in which ‘grace and truth came by Jesus 
Christ.’xx  Instead, Christ is displaced with what O’Neill calls the ‘enigmatic “thou”’ (33). As 
with the ‘awful Power’ in the first stanza of the poem, the spirit of beauty’s indefinability is 
emphasised through an avoidance of metaphor that acknowledges language’s inadequacy. 
The repetition of the grammatical conjunction ‘or’ in this passage is indicative of a struggle 
to adequately express this spirit’s ‘light’. It is either ‘like’ – again, a simile or approximation 
rather than metaphor – ‘mist o’er mountains driven,/Or music by the night-wind sent/ 
Through strings of some still instrument,/ Or moonlight on a midnight stream’ (my 
emphasis). The poet is unwilling to settle on a single image, name or, indeed, metaphor. To 
do so would be imprecise, restrictive and would lead the poet – or Shelley – onto the same 
path as those sages and poets critiqued at the start of the stanza that are guilty of 
epistemological shortcutting. Furthermore, settling on a single name or image following this 
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successive list of multiple instances of sublime experience is to be like ‘Religion’’s false ‘God’ 
in Queen Mab, in which all these multiple indefinable sources of the sublime are ‘bent’ to a 
single point: ‘And all their causes to an abstract point / Converging, thou didst bend, – and 
called it GOD!’ (VI. ll. 101-2). It is in this way that one can note how ‘Hymn to Intellectual 
Beauty’ advocates Shelley’s doctrine of ‘Necessity’ despite there being no explicit reference 
to the term. Indeed, Necessity’s observable ‘immense and uninterrupted chain of causes 
and effects’ without divine intervention, anticipates the scepticism of the Hymn (Queen 
Mab, note to VI. l. 198, ll.3-4).   
 The inability to define the spirit of beauty is continued into the Hymn’s next stanza:  
Love, Hope, and Self-esteem, like clouds depart 
  And come, for some uncertain moments lent. 
  Man were immortal and omnipotent, 
Didst thou, unknown and awful as thou art, 
Keep with thy glorious train firm state within his heart. 
  Thou messenger of sympathies, 
  That wax and wane in lovers’ eyes – 
Thou – that to human thought art nourishment, 
  Like darkness to a dying flame! 
  Depart not as thy shadow came, 
  Depart not – lest the grave should be, 
Like life and fear, a dark reality (ll. 37- 48). 
 
Here the ‘awful’ spirit is pointedly ‘unknown’ yet simultaneously the poet is keen to stress 
its impact on human thoughts and sensibilities. What follows is a contemplation of the 
potential for man’s immortality if only the spirit of beauty ‘would keep firm state within his 
heart.’xxi Despite the absence from man’s heart, this spirit nevertheless ‘nourish[es]’ ‘human 
thought’. The simile Shelley uses here, of ‘darkness to a dying flame’, however seems to 
both emphasise this spirit’s paradoxical absence and to demonstrate an anthropocentric 
universe. As Reiman and Freistat point out ‘the Spirit does not really feed human thought at 
all but sets off and calls attention to it because of its opposite, antithetical nature’ (92n). 
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The fact that the relationship between the spirit and human thought is likened to such an 
image establishes humanity as the true power in this dynamic; it is man’s thought – and not 
the spirit – that is the source of this flame.xxii With typical Shelleyan complexity, however, 
the fact that this ‘Spirit of Beauty’ is now likened to ‘darkness’ contrasts with its ‘light’ at the 
start of the stanza. This passage calls to mind T.E. Hulme’s notorious critique of 
Romanticism in ‘Romanticism and Classicism’ in which he bemoans how such an aesthetic 
places man at the centre of the universe, believing him a divine being: 
The instincts that find their right and proper outlet in religion must come out 
in some other way. You don’t believe in a God, so you begin to believe that 
man is a god. You don’t believe in Heaven, so you begin to believe in a 
heaven on earth.xxiii 
 
Although we may now dispute whether this notion of divine humanity is such a bad thing, or 
whether religion is indisputably the ‘right and proper outlet’ for such instincts, Hulme’s 
understanding of Romantic religion when applied to ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’ is perhaps 
not too wide of the mark.  
If man’s thought is accentuated like a candle against surrounding darkness there is 
also the added implication that humanity may be alone in the universe with no benevolent 
divine force as a guide. Instead, there is only absence. The fact that this spirit of beauty is 
‘unknown’ (l.40), ‘unseen’ (ll. 1, 2) and leaves man’s ‘state’ ‘vacant’ (ll. 16-17) supports this 
idea. This does not help to explain the poem’s title however, since it does not explain why 
Shelley should write a ‘hymn’ to something he acknowledges as absent. This is explained in 
the opening two lines of the poem, which establishes that ‘though unseen’, the Power 
‘Floats [...] among us’ (l. 2). The spirit of beauty is paradoxically both absent and present. 
This simultaneous absence and presence reflects Shelley’s difficulty in expressing intangible 
Dr Paul Whickman 
University of Derby 
or abstract concepts without reifying or deifying them. The absence is only the absence of a 
tangible, physical thing that can be empirically proved. 
In the Wordsworthianxxiv fifth stanza of the poem, the poet recollects how as a youth 
he naively ‘sought’ and attempted to commune with such intangible and unknowable spirits 
of nature as if to empirically verify their existence: 
While yet a boy I sought for ghosts, and sped 
  Through many a listening chamber, cave and ruin, 
  And starlight wood, with fearful steps pursuing 
Hopes of high talk with the departed dead. 
I called on poisonous names with which our youth is fed; 
   I was not heard – I saw them not – 
   When musing deeply on the lot 
Of life, at that sweet time when the winds are wooing 
   All vital things that wake to bring 
   News of buds and blossoming, - 
   Sudden, thy shadow fell on me; 
I shrieked, and clasped my hands in ecstasy! (ll. 49 – 60). 
 
The ‘poisonous names’ referred to here are the ‘frail spells’ of the third stanza, the names of 
‘God and Ghost and Heaven’. With references to sound and sight – ‘I was not heard – I saw 
them not’ – the youth fails in his attempt to empirically verify the existence of the beings 
supposedly signified by these names. The realisation that ‘God and Ghost and Heaven’ are in 
fact mere expressions and no more, is imagined as what at first appears to be like a 
Damascene conversion to the enlightened ‘religion’ of the abstract ‘Intellectual Beauty’. 
Bryan Shelley tentatively suggests this seeming conversion to have allusions to both 1 
Samuel 10:6 and Ezekiel 11:5 which talk of the spirit of the Lord either ‘coming’ or ‘falling’ 
upon the inspired subject, like beauty’s ‘shadow’ falling on the inspired youthful poet in 
Shelley’s poem.xxv If, however, such allusions are seen as simply determining the youth’s 
‘conversion’ to be akin to Biblical conversions, this would undermine the poem’s scepticism 
and resistance to the fixities of religion. Judith Chernaik reads this passage instead as 
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‘providing a religious metaphor for rational experience, substituting images of divine and 
external authority for [Shelley’s] own mind and conscience.’xxvi For Chernaik then, Shelley 
simply uses a religious register in depicting an experiential event rather than suggesting it is 
literally analogous to a religious conversion. This reading also emphasises further the 
alliance of ‘Romantic’ imagination and empiricism – or vision and rationality – observed 
throughout the poem. Although Chernaik’s suggestion at first seems fitting considering that 
the poem is simultaneously resistant to established religion and a ‘hymn’, she does not 
consider the possibility for melodrama in the youth’s ‘conversion’ that would appear to 
mock traditional conversion narratives. In fact, Chernaik goes as far as to argue that the 
poet’s ‘ecstasy is the appropriate human response to a divine visitation’ (37). Determining 
whether shrieking or clasping one’s hands is, indeed, an ‘appropriate human response’ to 
such an event is a subjective comment. Equally, if read as mockingly melodramatic rather 
than ‘appropriate’, there is the potential for a stronger anti-religious reading of this passage 
than Chernaik allows for. 
Although the following stanza seems to imply that the poet has become a devout 
follower of the path opened up to him through his ‘conversion’, upon further reading the 
truth is more complex. The poet declares: 
I vowed that I would dedicate my powers 
  To thee and thine – have I not kept the vow? 
  With beating heart and streaming eyes, even now 
I call the phantoms of a thousand hours 
Each from his voiceless grave […] (ll. 61-5). 
 
If the epiphany in the previous stanza is a ‘conversion’ to rationalism and realisation of the 
unverifiable nature of the supernatural – whether we perceive it to be mocking religion or 
to be adopting the particular register of religion – then it is, in fact, as if the conversion 
never happened. Despite the poet’s realisation in youth that seeking and calling for ghosts 
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or other supernatural beings is fruitless, the mature poet in this stanza ‘even now’ calls 
upon ‘phantoms’ from their ‘voiceless grave[s]’. It is as if he has not heeded his youthful 
findings. The reference to ‘phantoms’ as opposed to ‘ghosts’ in the previous stanza, 
however, is a significant difference. Whereas ‘ghost’ is more indicative of an actual thing, 
whether incorporeal or otherwise, ‘phantom’ is more suggestive of a hallucination or a 
delusion, reinforced by the word’s etymology from the Old French for ‘illusion’. The change 
to ‘phantoms’ then implies the older poet’s increased resistance to reifying those 
perceptions in which no causality is easily discerned. These ‘phantoms’ are acknowledged as 
the products of individual fantasy – from the Greek, ‘phantasy’ – rather than actual de facto 
reality. 
 If these phantoms are the product of the poet’s imagination, there is the suggestion 
that the move in this stanza is one towards a worship of the poet’s own mind, or, as is often 
referred to in relation to Wordsworth, the egotistical sublime:  
[the phantoms] have in visioned bowers 
   Of studious zeal or love’s delight 
   Outwatched with me the envious night –  
They know that never joy illumed my brow 
   Unlinked with hope that thou wouldst free 
   This world from its dark slavery, 
   That thou – O awful LOVELINESS, 
Wouldst give whate’er these words cannot express (ll. 66-72). 
 
The image presented here, however, is not of a simple worship of the phantoms of the 
poet’s imagination. Whereas the poet of the previous stanza seeks for ghosts in order to 
satisfy his youthful philosophical inquisitiveness, here the seeking after answers is presented 
through active study. Instead of finding a shortcut to knowledge through worship of a 
concrete divine figure, the poet here is a true scholar full of ‘studious zeal’xxvii; he must learn 
it for himself. The focus on empiricism in this passage is demonstrated by the number of 
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references to sight and illumination that again recall the Lockean emphasis on the visual 
sense.  The phantoms ‘Outwatch’ with the poet in his places of study that are depicted as 
‘visioned bowers’. The ambiguity of the word ‘visioned’, in that it suggests imagination 
almost as much as literal sight, emphasises again the connection between empiricism and 
‘Romantic’ imagination as discussed throughout this essay. Through his attainment of 
knowledge the poet’s brow is ‘illumed’ and hope is expressed that the addressed Power will 
bring light to free the world from its ‘dark slavery’ of superstition. The movement to a state 
of enlightenment is depicted almost literally as if from night to day, of a scholar studying all 
through the ‘envious night’ until daybreak.  
Shelley returns to imagery similar to that used here, in describing individual 
enlightenment, when Rousseau relates the intervention in human history of Francis Bacon 
and his scientific method in The Triumph of Life (1822): 
[…] still had kept  
The jealous keys of truth’s eternal doors 
 
“If Bacon’s spirit [ ] had not leapt 
   Like lightning out of darkness; he compelled 
The Proteus shape of Nature’s as it slept 
 
   “To wake and to unbar the caves that held 
The treasure of the secrets of its reign – (Shelley’s Poetry & Prose, 491-2, ll. 267-273). 
 
The Baconian Method – ‘Bacon’s spirit’ – is likened to ‘lightning out of darkness’ that, like 
the studies of the poet in ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’, similarly ‘enlightens’ the darkness of 
human ignorance. The fact that the lightning compels ‘Nature’ to ‘wake’ brings to mind the 
experiments and scientific enquiry of figures such as Luigi Galvani and Humphrey Davy, 
whose ‘galvanism’ was of course cited by Mary Shelley as an influence on Frankenstein 
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(1818). The lightning functions here both as a symbol of enlightening scientific enquiry as 
well as an animator of matter. 
Whereas the empirical method of Bacon apparently leads humanity to ‘truth’ (l. 268) 
in that it ‘unbars’ Nature’s ‘secrets’, the received enlightenment of the poet figure of ‘Hymn 
to Intellectual Beauty’ is not to be in receipt of an absolute certain truth. Instead, the 
knowledge gained is in the Socratic mode, that true knowledge exists in knowing that you 
know nothing. The conjured phantoms do not help the poet in determining absolute 
knowledge since they are ‘voiceless’, lacking the appropriate language and discourse. But 
the poet too lacks this necessary language, still at this late stage of the poem acknowledging 
his own language’s inadequacy. He does not settle down to define the spirit of beauty, 
content to refer to it only as an abstract ‘awful LOVELINESS’. Crucially, this loveliness 
‘wouldst give whate’er these words cannot express.’ There is something, an enlightenment 
beyond language that contemplation of the universe can bring, even if such enlightenment 
simply reminds the enlightened of their own ignorance. Those, therefore, who attempt to 
confine and define the secrets of the universe into simple words and names such as ‘God’ 
‘Ghost’ and ‘Heaven’ are in serious error.  
 In the difficult final stanza of the poem we have an apparent shift in which the 
inadequacies of a solely empirical approach to the universe are emphasised: 
The day becomes more solemn and serene 
  When noon is past – there is a harmony 
  In autumn, and a lustre in its sky, 
Which through the summer is not heard or seen, 
As if it could not be, as if it had not been! (ll. 73-7). 
 
If the world exists only as we perceive it then, in summer, the evidence of our senses would 
tell us that autumn ‘could not be, as if it had not been’ since, again a reference to sound and 
sight, it is not ‘heard or seen’. This is because, as Chernaik contends, ‘the evidence of the 
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senses is limited to present time’ (40). For Shelley, the changing of the seasons, as seen in 
the later ‘Ode to the West Wind’ (1820) or ‘England in 1819’ (1819), is frequently imagined 
as a natural indicator of the potential for socio-political change. If the senses cannot 
perceive the possibility of this change, then hope is lost. The poet’s turn towards the spirit 
of beauty at the end of the stanza and the poem entire, in Chernaik’s words therefore 
shows that ‘hope is warranted, even imperative, against all contrary evidence’ (40). The 
poem ends: 
   Thus let thy power, which like the truth 
   Of nature on my passive youth 
Descended, to my onward life supply 
   Its calm – to one who worships thee, 
   Whom, SPIRIT fair, thy spells did bind 
To fear himself, and love all human kind (ll. 78 – 84). 
 
Rather than dismissing empirical philosophy as inadequate, the poet instead learns to 
compromise, allowing it to sit alongside a sublime indefinable experience that helps to 
assert the importance of the human mind. Rather than fearing God and his commandments, 
the poet instead learns to ‘fear’, have reverence for,  his own mind, and in doing so to love 
mankind. In contrast to the ‘frail spells’ of ‘God’ and ‘Ghost’ and ‘Heaven’, this indefinable 
sublime Power has ‘spells’ of its own. 
This article has demonstrated the possibility of reading ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’ 
as a poem wrestling with empirical scepticism, of language and the universe more widely, 
and with the poetic attempt to come to terms with Shelley’s ‘sublime’ experiences in 1816. 
In this poem, a philosophical or thematic problem becomes one of poetics, a poetical 
problem of expression. Attempting to define and confine sublime experience with the word 
‘God’ is not just philosophically flawed, but also poetically inadequate, a dishonest failure to 
capture the essence of the experience. Shelley is conscious of the inadequacy of language 
Dr Paul Whickman 
University of Derby 
and refuses to reduce and confine experience to flawed words and metaphors; 
approximation is as good as you are going to get. In this sense, Shelley becomes both poet 
and ‘sage’ by perversely admitting he does not know.  
Shelley’s critique of religion is one rooted in his concern for appropriate linguistic 
expression and is as much apparent in ‘Hymn to Intellectual Beauty’ as it is in the earlier 
Queen Mab. This is something Shelley acquired from his reading of Enlightenment-era 
philosophy. By determining the ‘problem’ of the Christian God to be a deficiency of 
language, Shelley can therefore both express and work this through aesthetically in his 
poetry. Over the course of his career, Shelley moved from articulating concern for the 
Christian anthropomorphising of an abstract concept, ‘God’, in Queen Mab to settling on the 
crucially indefinable term ‘Power’ when writing of sublime experience in ‘Hymn to 
Intellectual Beauty’ and later poems. In this sense, the poetry and experiences of 1816 can 
be read as the beginning of a transition in Shelley’s thought and, therefore, his aesthetics.  
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